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The Desiring Subject and the Promise of Salvation: 
A Lacanian Study of Sor Juana's El divino Narciso 
Matthew D. Stroud 
Tnnity University 
Abstract Both Sor Juana's El divino Narciso and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic writings deal with the nature of 
humankind and the nature of God. This article examines the play and its religious philosophy in light of Lacan's 
imaginary, symbolic, and real registers, as well as Lacan's important concepts of the Other, the divided subject, 
jouissance, and the death drive. Ultimately, both Lacan and Sor Juana arrive at the same conclusion, that the basis 
of the religious experience is grounded in the "lack" in both the subject and God, and that only death can bring the 
promised state of purity. 
Key Words: Juana Ines de Ia Cruz (Sor), Divino Narciso(£!), auto sacramental, Lacan Oacques), psychoanaly­
sis, otherness, split subject (Ichspa!tuniJ, death drive, religion, 17th century Mexican literature 
T he overt message of SorJuanalnes de la  Cruz'sE/ divino Narciso is  quite clear: if one gives up the pleasures and 
pains of this life Oove, sex, honor, rivalry) in 
favor of the duties of the Church (command­
ments, sacraments, responsibilities) , one will 
be rewarded with the tranquillity of a society 
marked by law and order, and in the next life 
one will achieve ecstatic union with God. 
Naturaleza Humana, by submitting her de­
sires to the commandments of God, ends the 
play in an apotheosis of union with Narciso, a 
sublimation of her nature as a human subject. 
Eco, on the other hand, remains unredeemed 
at the end, left out of the glory of the happy 
couple, because she was unwilling to set aside 
her own lust and rivalry. This moral lesson is 
quite typical of the religious theater of the 
Spanish Baroque that attempted to put for­
ward a doctrinal whole. The modem reader, 
however, can look beyond the primary mes­
sage to a consideration of the nature of the 
human subject and its relation to others, the 
Other, the object of desire, speech, fantasy, 
and death, concepts that are at the heart of the 
psychoanalytic writings of Jacques Lacan. 
Reading Sor Juana's seventeenth-century auto 
in the light of Lacan' s twentieth century theory 
highlights the commonality of both texts in 
their understanding of the human condition. 
The Imaginruy Register 
Central to Jacques Lacan's conception of 
the human condition is the notion of the di­
vided subject. Everyone suffers from a radical 
split in the unconscious, a Spaltungin Freud's 
terminology. As a result, the subject is whole 
in neither essence nor behavior. To delineate 
the various levels on which the subject acts, 
Lacan created the concept of "registers" and 
redefined common terms to denote them. The 
"imaginary" register is the result of the "mir­
ror stage" through which everyone passes as 
an infant. By viewing itself in a mirror, or in 
the mirror image that others provide, the sub­
ject learns jubilantly that it is a unified whole 
and, despairingly, that it is constructed around 
a lack, an inability ever to unite with others. 
The response of the subject to this devastat­
ing revelation is the identification with imagos 
that give one the illusion of wholeness, of au­
tonomy, of power. The imaginary is the locus 
of the ego and of relationships between sub­
ject and object in which the subject is really 
involved only with its own desires that it finds 
echoed to it from the object.1 It is also the reg­
ister of rivalry, deception, and ego defenses. 
The world of the characters at the begin­
ning of the El divtno Narciso is marked by in­
tense imaginary activity. The basic plot struc­
ture is that of the rivalry for Narciso between 
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Eco and Naturaleza Humana, a relation that 
is described as "rencor," "pena," "odio mortal," 
and "rabiosa queja" (657--60) , 2  in short, jeal­
ousy (see, for example, 230ft., 1891-94) . To try 
to seduce Narciso while foiling Naturaleza 
Humana's identical plan, Eco invents decep­
tions and tricks so that her rival might appear 
unattractive or distorted to Narciso (413-23, 
622-28) or, even better, so that Narciso might 
never lay his eyes on her again (453-54, 1701-
2) and that he will forget her entirely (1706--
9) . At the heart of Eco's desperate measures 
is a desire on her part to conquer, to eliminate 
not only her rival but, when he rejects her, 
Narciso as well. It is a struggle to the death, 
the fundamental characteristic of human re­
lations in the imaginary register (Lacan, 
Stfminaire III51) , as we see in Eco's words: 
con declarados odios 
tengo de procurarte 
Ia muerte, para ver 
si mi pena implacable 
muere con que tu mueras, 
o acaba con que acabes. (813-18) 
In addition, she is filled with pride and self-love 
(301-15; see also 641-42) ,  both of which ap­
pear as characters just to underscore the 
theme. 
lllustrating Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, 
the action of the play is structured by images 
of mirrors (1981-85) and of the similarities 
between subjects that lead to the rivalries and 
deceptions just enumerated. Stephanie 
Merrirn (112) has noted the various "layers of 
mirroring" present in the play, not only in the 
basic plot line involving narcissistic reflection 
and the love of similarity, but also between the 
loa and the play, Christianity and non-Chris­
tian religions, and truth and fiction (allegory) . 
Eco's specular relation with others is obvious 
even in her name, which recalls a basis in re­
flection and identity. likewise, we are told that 
Naturaleza Humana is made in Narciso's im­
age (455-56; cf. 215) , a concept made concrete 
when Eco notes that Naturaleza Humana's is 
the reflection that Narciso sees when he looks 
into the pool of water: 
su misma semejanza contemplando 
esta en ella, y mirando 
a Ia Naturaleza Humana en ella.(1318--22)3 
When one asks the often repeated question, 
"lQue es lo que miro?", the answer is most 
often the image of one's own desires. In the 
pool of water, Narciso sees an other with 
which he wants to be joined and he sees him­
self simultaneously in the same place. When 
Eco, hearing Narciso, asks the same question 
(1306) , she sees the object of her demand for 
love who does not see her: there is no specular 
imaginary relationship here, only the one be­
tween Eco and her fantasy of union with 
Narciso, which is doomed to fail (see also 
1318) . 
This specular relationship is closely related 
to the more general concept of love, which is 
both based in and sustained by imaginary 
identifications, at least in part.4 With its con­
nection to ego defenses and rivalries, love pro­
duces effects typical of imaginary anxieties, as 
Naturaleza Humana indicates: 
Mi imagen representa 
si Narciso repara, 
clara, clara; 
porque a! mirarla sienta 
del amor los efectos, 
ansias, deseos, lagrimas y afectos.(l113-18) 
The imaginary manifestations of love are a 
function of the subject's desire for an other, 
an object, that will make it whole. This passion 
is part of the human condition, a characteris­
tic of being "hombre no mas" (683) , and ref­
erences to hunger and thirst are frequent, as 
when Naturaleza Humana says that she hun­
gers for God just as she hungers for her own 
center (110-11) , an incontrovertible reference 
to the search for an object that will make her 
feel complete. When Gracia tells Naturaleza 
Humana to find dear waters (like a mirror) in 
order to wait for Narciso to slake the thirst that 
bums in him (1024-77) , we see in her words 
not only the specular nature of desire, at least 
on one level, but also the fantasy of fulfillment 
in the hope that the thirst can be quenched: 
... vuelve tU Ia imagen clara 
de Ia beldad de Narciso, 
que en ti sola se retrata 
con perfeccion su belleza, 
sin borron su semejanza! (1054-58) 
The imaginary promise is always one of 
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wholeness, whether it is expressed in terms 
of power, of absolute independence, or of a 
consuming love, as Eco implies: 
Todo, bello Narciso, 
sujeto a mi dictamen, 
son posesiones mias, 
son mis bienes dotales. 
y todo sera tuyo, 
si tU con pecho afable 
depones lo severo 
y llegas a adorarme. (795-802) 
The subject hopes that this happy promise can 
fulfill its wishes; N aturaleza Humana antici­
pates the joys of love: 
... y logra mi deseo 
las alegres promesas amorosas . .. . (887-88) 
While specular love appears to require reci­
procity, as when Naturaleza Humana declares 
her intention to "solicitar los amores I de 
Dios" (121-22) , actually, as Gracia states, 
there is little difference between love of one's 
self and love of one's mirror image: 
viendo en el hombre su imagen, 
se enamor6 de si mismo. 
(2019-20; see also 460-64, 1543) 
Because of the egoistic short circuit in 
which it is trapped, love in the imaginary, and 
the imaginary register in general, are inca­
pable of fulfilling the demands of the subject, 
as Narciso notes: 
Mirando lo que apetezco, 
estoy sin poder gozarlo . . . (1454-55). 
The frustration caused by incompletion and 
insatisfaction results in effects that go beyond 
the jealousy and rivalry already mentioned to 
suffering, hate, 5 and metaphorical death: 
Ya, ya llego, 
a! termino fatal por mi querida . ... 
(1602-3; see also 17 42-54) 
Since the imaginary register is bound up 
only in the connections between an insatiable 
ego and impossible objects, all efforts to 
achieve any kind of satisfaction are, as Eco 
says, "en vano" (see 428-38) ; like Naturaleza 
Humana, one feels alone and helpless (1797) ; 
"olvidado de si" (67 4) . Every subject in the 
imaginary is caught in an egoistic short circuit 
that not only prevents satisfaction by the other 
but even precludes the possibility of any kind 
of real relationship.6 The specular nature of 
the love between Narciso and Naturaleza 
Humana is not guaranteed by any external 
truth. Its instability is made apparent when 
Eco clouds the waters (with sin) , destroying 
the reflection (622-28) . 
The Symbolic Register 
As the play warns, the hoped-for wholeness 
and unity simply cannot be attained through 
self-love and egoistic action, that is, through 
the imaginary register alone (157 4-76) . In or­
der to reach out to others, the subject must 
first have access to, and subordinate itself to, 
a third term that will provide an interface be­
tween two subjects: symbolization, language, 
the law, the Other, all of which comprise 
Lacan's "symbolic" register. 7The law, as we 
are told by Sinagoga and Gentilidad (40-41) , 
should be written on the hearts of all people 
to warn them of the dangers of the imaginary 
rivalry to the death. Without the law, one lives 
in error. The symbolic promises a guarantee 
of objective truth offered in the terms of the 
play by the Church (37 -38) . This truth is seen 
to be something almost tangible that resides 
in the Other who is supposed to know (see 
Lacan, Ecnts 94-96) . One expects, even de­
mands, the truth from the Other, and Narciso, 
in his role as the son of God, reassures 
Naturaleza Humana of his "inmensa I sabi­
duria" (1934-35) . 
Speech is the agency that both structures 
and allows access to the symbolic register.8 
Only through speech can subjects come to­
gether to agree on anything at all. A healthy 
human subject is just that only insofar as it can 
speak. In the terms of the play, Eco's symp­
tom, her speech dysfunction, her ability only 
to repeat the last words said to her (1332-59, 
1390-1439, 14 71-1602) , is a concrete example 
of her failure to submit to the signifier, the 
symbolic. Throughout the play, there are ref­
erences to both speech and silence, writing 
and erasure (264-66, 575-76, 669-70, 1332-
59, 1660, 1715-18, 1967-68) . Indeed,Jane E. 
Ackerman has stated that the play has one 
focus: "the efficacy of the Word" (63) . It is pre-
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cisely the accession to language, the insis­
tence of the signifier in the subject, that con­
stitutes the subject, the subject that cannot 
reach its object except through language, the 
subject denoted by its failings, as we see in 
Naturaleza Humana's complaints of incom­
pletion (201-40 and 1797-99). 
The role of the symbolic father (as opposed 
to the real or any other kind of father) is es­
sential in the necessary functioning of the 
structuring signifier of the unconscious, 
which Lacan calls the "phallic signifier" or, 
metaphorically, the "Name of the Father."9 In 
the play, the figure that embodies the sym­
bolic register is God the father. His is the 
name that we are to praise eternally (6--7, 
2146). His power functions both directly and 
through intermediaries such as the Church, 
represented here as Sinagoga (7, 42). God is 
the representation of the Other as father, the 
dead father, the powerful father, king forever 
(539, 547,1221,895--96, 1873--74; see Regnault 
46-47, 61-62). His is the name invoked when 
one appeals to the Other for help (545). His 
promise, as Narciso tells us, is to give the sub­
ject "remedios a sus peligros" (1905), to be 
there for the subject whenever it needs Him 
(1979-21). Perhaps the clearest example of 
the symbolic mediation of desire is the insti­
tution of marriage. Eco and Naturaleza 
Humana both lust after Narciso; both believe 
they can fulfill their desires for him by being 
his wife (385--86). This concept of symbolic 
union is reminiscent of the Platonic notion of 
the nostalgia for a primordial union with the 
One, to which Eco alludes when she says that 
Narciso contains sparks of the first origin 
which the noble being remembers (528-30). 
Only Naturaleza Humana, however, actually 
submits her passion to the symbolic, gives 
herself over to the sacrament (2127): she be­
comes Narciso's spouse (1296, 1865). 
For a fully functioning, speaking human 
subject, one's desire is the desire of the sym­
bolic Other, in both of its potential meanings: 
one's desire is the desire for the Other, and 
one's desire is the Other's desire (Lacan, 
Ecnts-312). Narciso is the attractive object of 
desire (83-101, 399-400, 413-23, 819-20, 
1849), able to seduce even the rocks and 
mountains (194-98), the lure that entraps the 
egos of Eco and Naturaleza Humana in a web 
of love and rivalry (182-84) .10 He is the target 
of Eco and Naturaleza Humana's feminine 
wiles: they try to get him to desire them as 
much as they desire him (121-22)Y In addi­
tion to being the desired object, he is also the 
desiring subject, whose passion, like Natura­
leza Humana's, is expressed in terms of hun­
ger and thirst (1232, 1235). In a theatrical rep­
resentation of the desire of the Other which 
is both the cause and the object of the subject's 
desire, Narciso, at the same time that he is 
sought by Natura-leza Humana, likewise 
seeks her out as a shepherd looks for a lost 
sheep (1133--36, 1147-50). That he engages 
actively in the imaginary love triangle is seen 
not only in his obviously specular (narcissis­
tic) relationship with Naturaleza Humana 
(1543), but also, as was the case with Eco, in 
his very name. As a member of this imaginary 
relationship, he is by no means exempt from 
the egoistic actions and thoughts typical of a 
lover (1211-20, 1486--88). Although one might 
wish to escape the imaginary for the promise 
of the symbolic, one can never leave behind 
the imaginary register. There is no actual pro­
gression from the imaginary to the symbolic; 
the subject is always engaged in both. 
The Real Register 
According to Lacan, all speaking subjects 
always hope that the Other will be able to fill 
the gaps, to replace, or at least cover over, the 
object that is missing, the objet a that ''falls out'' 
at the moment of the original splitting of the 
subject. This object, and the lack created by 
its omission, although they produce important 
effects in both the imaginary and symbolic 
registers, are themselves part of a third regis­
ter, the "real," impossible to attain and inac­
cessible in any direct way in either the imagi­
nary or the symbolic (Lacan, Ecrits 195--96, 
286, 296, 319-20). A case could be made for 
the equation of this division of the subject, its 
irrecoverable separation from the Other, and 
original sin. In this case, the sin is not in hav­
ing been born, as Calderon said in La vida es 
sueiio, but in being divided by submitting to 
the Name of the Father, a religious tautology 
in which God in essence causes the failure of 
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the subject. It is the decentered nature of the 
human being that causes the "errors" in both 
the imaginazy and symbolic registers: one way 
or another the human subject is always look­
ing for something to fill the gaps at its core 
(Lacan, Seminar//, 160, 326). But because the 
lack is inherent to the human condition, the 
symbolic promise to span the gap and recover 
the lost object is not only doomed to failure, it 
also has significant negative consequences. It 
promises satisfaction, but in return for the 
sacrifice of individual ego demands. Submis­
sion to the Other is accompanied by an enor­
mous sacrifice of the self as in the example of 
God's commandment to Abraham to kill Isaac 
(551--62) as a sacrifice to the law. The subject 
fades before the primacy of the signifier. In 
fact, there is no subject without fading, or 
aphanisis; as soon as the subject "appears 
somewhere as meaning, he is manifested else­
where as 'fading,' as disappearance".12 One 
must give up the pleasure of the ego (the im­
age of autonomous unity) for the assurances 
of law and order. Moreover, the promise is not 
open-ended: Eco tells us that Narciso is of 
such a nature that, if one offends him even 
once, one cannot return to grace (428-30), 
and, even if one accepts the offer, "nadie es 
capaz I de satisfacerla" (431-32). 
More importantly, the Other itself is not 
whole; there is no Other of the Other, no guar­
antee of the absolute, objective truth that the 
subject demands of the Other; the symbolic 
simply cannot fulfill its promise of comple­
tion.13 Truth, in psychoanalysis, resides in the 
desire of the subject, which is in tum desire 
of the Other. If God represents the Other, then 
saying that God represents the truth at one 
and the same time puts God in the locus of 
truth but only insofar as He constitutes the 
subject's desire for the impossible object. The 
truth that we want the Other to guarantee is 
always relative to the desires of the subject 
that asked for it, desires that spring from the 
subject's incompletion. Lacan has noted that 
the usual ways in which one looks for truth 
and wisdom are functions of mastery, of the 
ego, that are related to what he calls the "para­
noiac principle of human knowledge" (Ecn"ts 
138). Because one is always separated from 
any "objective" truth of the world by imperfect 
systems of perception and interpretation, and 
because there is no error that is not posed as 
truth, the only certain truth in a psychoanalytic 
sense lies in the subject's desire (see Lacan, 
Seminar I, 168, 263; Ragland-Sullivan, "Mag­
netism" 385, 392). 
Even language, the basis of symbolic me­
diation, is itself uncertain, changing, shifting, 
deficient, as we see in Naturaleza Humana's 
assertion: 
una cosa es Ia que entiende 
y otra cosa Ia que oye. (154-55, see also 502-6) 
Since the Other can provide no absolute guar­
antee, the signifiers are constantly sliding, 
causing speech to be always relative (Lacan, 
Ecn"ts 154). Because of the subject's constitu­
tive relationship with the Other, direct com­
munication with another subject is, in a very 
real sense, impossible; one's message is re­
turned to the sender but inverted (Lacan, 
"Seminar on The Purloined Letter'" 72). The 
clearest example of the failure of language is 
Eco's dysfunctional speech.H For Merrim, this 
destabilizing use of language demonstrates 
Eco' s ability to ''wrest others' words from their 
original context and oblige them to serve her 
own purposes" as well as her inability to speak 
except by "figuring others' words" (114). 
The consequences of incompletion that we 
see in matters relating to truth, language, love, 
and the subject become even more problem­
atic and interesting with regard to the nature 
of God. God is supposed to be the omnipotent 
father, the author of law, the guarantor of the 
universe. But He, as the Other, cannot be a 
unified whole. He is not all-powerful and all­
encompassing: the devil also has power, and 
His creatures have the free will to reject Him. 
He is not all. The benefit of His incompletion 
is that, unlike the perfect "philosopher's God," 
He is therefore able to have a personal, 
intersubjective relationship with His creations 
(see Regnault 32-47). The clearest example 
of this quality of not-all is His division into 
three: father, son, and holy spirit (see 156-59, 
326, 351, 2146). God the father has no signifi­
cant theatrical role in the play, but we can see 
the consequences of His incompletion in the 
character of His son, Narciso, who, as we have 
seen, suffers from the same divisions, the 
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same imaginary relationship, the same de­
sires as do Eco and Naturaleza Humana. At 
the same time, he is also the son of God 
(1675) , the incarnation of the Other, Christ 
who died so that our sins might be mediated 
(2087-2100) . His roles are doubled (and per­
haps tripled) : Narciso's handsomeness is an 
imaginary lure, but, since he also represents 
the Other, his lack also serves as a lure be­
cause it is in that unsymbolized place in the 
Other that the subject finds the outline of its 
lost and irrecoverable object a. Narciso main­
tains his love relationships, but he also wishes 
to hide his face from his flock: 
Yo escondere mi cara. .. 
de este ingrato, perverso, infiel ganado. 
(1202, 1205) 
Later on, he tells Echo not to hope to see his 
eyes (1590) and Naturaleza Humana not to 
touch him (1872) . One is specifically forbid­
den from looking upon the face of God; to see 
the face of God is to die. The phallic signifier 
must remain veiled (I..acan, "Desire" 48) . 
The disunity of his character is clearly in­
dicated by the text of the auto. Eco realizes 
that Narciso is the son of God and notes that 
he was born to a ''verdadera mujer" (603-4) , 
and perhaps we may conclude that he inher­
ited his complex nature from his mixed par­
entage. Even in his aspiration to perfection in 
the Other, he will always carry with him the 
part that comes from the real woman, that is, 
he can never be whole on that account. At the 
same time, he is not just an object of Natura­
leza Humana's desire, he is an imago that 
structures her identity: his image is in her 
(215) . When he says that he is "soberano" 
(1221) , it is simultaneously an assertion of his 
imaginary wholeness and the supposed om­
nipotence of the Other. God, the Other, is also 
Narciso, the other. Narciso's actions both as 
a subject in his relations with Eco and 
Naturaleza Humana and as the Other in his 
divinity cause us to question the harmonious 
unity posited by the message of the play. 
The action follows a trajectory toward an 
apotheosis of unity. There is a clear indication 
that God supposedly moves from not-all, from 
being able to have an intersubjective relation 
with the subject, to a totalizing, and totalized 
perfection, and that the subject is carried away 
and made one with the Other (and, in the pro­
cess, lost as an individual subject) , as in the 
marriage of N aturaleza Humana and Narciso 
at the end (1299) . Naturaleza Humana is like 
every subject when she calls to the Other, she 
wants the Other to respond as the omnipotent, 
all-seeing, all-knowing God who will fill in the 
lack at the core of her being.15 But we have 
seen that the auto has structured the charac­
ters of God and Narciso as divided speaking 
subjects unable to fulfill the promise of 
completion for Eco. While she is indeed aban­
doned because of her unwillingness to submit 
to the law, God's grace, which no one can earn 
by any symbolic means, is also applied un­
evenly: Gracia embraces Naturaleza Humana 
but Eco is not offered the same benefit.16 By 
juxtaposing the offer of salvation and the 
incompletion of God, E! divino Narciso shows 
up the basic flaw in the symbolic promise: one 
must already be inscribed in the symbolic in 
order to hear its promise; in order for God to 
offer salvation, one must first have already 
accepted it by believing in Him. In light of the 
inability of either the imaginary or the sym­
bolic to fulfill their promises of wholeness, this 
unity, and, indeed, the message of the play it­
self, can only be seen as the fantasy of the 
subject. 
The Death Drive 
That God is an object of fantasy shows that, 
in asking for completion from God, one asks 
not just for symbolic mediation or imaginary 
love, but a;ouis:s"ancethat goes far beyond any 
comfort provided by the other two registers, 
to the register of the real, and leads us to a 
direct confrontation with death. jouis:s"ance is 
not pleasure in the normal, conscious mean­
ing of the term. In fact, the experience of it in 
the real is quite unpleasant. Rather ,;ouis:s"ance 
is the unconscious celebration of the lack of 
the subject, of the Ichspa!tung, closely related 
to hysteria, psychosis, and the death drive 
(I..acan,Ecnts-318-20, "Kant" 60-61, 95n) . The 
closer one gets to God, the more one ap­
proaches ;ouis:s"ance (Ragland-Sullivan, "Dora" 
213, 216, 219, 222-23, 225; Regnault 101, 108) . 
Complete unity with God, as the mystics de-
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scribed it, would go beyond whatever the sym­
bolic can offer to an impossible ex-stasy, a 
being outside of one's being, and, of course, 
the disappearance of the subject itself. Lacan 
termed this state p!us-de-jouir, an excess and 
a cessation of jouissance at the same time 
(Lacan, Feminine 144-45) . Thus, union with 
God implies the death of the subject, which 
is in a real sense absolute jouissance, a p!us­
de·:/ouir. This is the ultimate expression of 
Christian desire. 
Even though N aturaleza Humana uses 
some of the discourse of mysticism ("mi 
divino amado," 939) , this play is not mystical: 
there is no conjoining of the two entities ex­
cept in a symbolic, metaphorical sense (mar­
riage) . Still, when Narciso looks for Natura­
leza Humana as a lost sheep, he says that he 
would rather die than give up the search 
(1162-65) . He says specifically that it was love 
that made mortal him who was immortal 
(1496-99, see also 1742-54, 2033-38) . The 
Other as an abstraction, the perfect, non-ex­
istent Other that is supposed to resolve the 
subject's misery, that may be conceived of as 
independent of the subject, is immortal, but 
once it partakes of human subjectivity, it too 
is subject to mortality. When Narciso dies, sin 
is forgiven: "se borran nuestras ofensas" ( 669-
70) . Narciso's goal is death ("baje a morir," 
1548) , which is both symbolically metaphori­
cal of imaginary pain, and captions the death 
drive in the real. As Narciso points out, death 
should be the end of sin, the end of suffering, 
the end of mortality, the end of the subject's 
division: 
Ya licencia a Ia muerte doy: ya entrego 
el alma, a que del cuerpo Ia divida, 
aunque en ella y en el quedani asida 
mi deidad, que las vuelva a reunir luego. 
Sed tengo: que el amor que me ha abrasado, 
aun con todo el dolor que padeciendo 
estoy, mi coraz6n aun no ha saciado. 
iPadre! ,:Por que en un trance tan tremendo 
me desamparas? Ya esti consumado. 
iEn tus manos mi espiritu encomiendo!(1606--15) 
like Naturaleza Humana, Narciso views his 
union with his Father in terms of a fantasy to 
be crossed. In this regard, this union is per­
fect ecstasy in all registers, but one can only 
achieve this ex-stasy in death. When the sub-
ject dies, its structuring signifiers, its relation 
to the Other, and the promises of wholeness, 
die in their fulfillment. The life of the subject 
is therefore little more than "a defect in the 
purity of Non-Being" (Lacan, Ecrits 317) ; 
through death, salvation is a return to purity. 
Conclusion 
T he splitting of the human subject and its relationship to the Other is not just a fictional construct of twentieth-cen­
tury psychoanalysis. The metaphysical, mys­
tical characteristics of Golden Age theology 
also leave no doubt about their understanding 
of the divided nature of the human subject and 
its relation to God. Just as the human being is 
not complete within its being, neither is God 
rational, distant, perfect, and uninterested. 
Each participant in the relationship must nec­
essarily be lacking in some area to which the 
other can appeal, but that very lack under­
mines the promise made. Christian theoreti­
cians have given considerable thought and 
importance to the lack of unity in the concepts 
of God, namely the fact that one man, Jesus 
Christ, could have both divine and human 
natures, while God Himself has three mani­
festations (father, son, holy spirit) Y Enor­
mous psychoanalytic intuition is at work in the 
religious theater of the Golden Age, whether 
in the comedia or in the auto sacramental As 
Henry Sullivan has noted (613-14, 617) , 
Calderon's view of the human subject seems 
to anticipate modem psychoanalysis, not so 
much in clinical practice with its emphasis on 
the individual unconscious, but paradigmatic 
psychoanalysis with its ability to tell us some­
thing about the human subject in general. Sor 
Juana, too, seems to share Calderon's vision 
of the human condition, and E! divino Narciso 
provides a case study of the paradigmatic role 
of psychoanalysis in literary texts. In their re­
jection of Cartesian certainty and the illusion 
of wholeness, pre-modem literature and post­
modem theory converge in their study of the 
human subject. 
•NOTES 
1Lacan's discussion of the mirror stage appears as 
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the first selection in Ecnrs: A Selection, 1-7. For over­
views of Lacan's definitions of the imaginary register, 
see Lee (17-30) and Ragland-Sullivan, jacques Lacon 
(130-59). 
2The standard edition of Sor Juana's works is the 4-
volume Obras completas edited by Alfonso Mendez 
Plancarte (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1955). 
The line numbers for El divino Narciso are unfortunately 
in error above line 909. As a result, the citations here 
are from Ripoll and Valdespino's anthology. Except for 
occasional punctuation and capitalization differences, 
the text is identical to that found in the Obras completas. 
3See also 251-54. Naturaleza Humana is an even 
more interesting figure than the normal allegorical char­
acters of autos sacramentales. Not only is she at once 
both concept and personification, there is also her role 
as mother, the "madre I comun de todos los hombres" 
(28-29). Although it is beyond the scope of this study, 
another fruitful approach to this play might be in terms 
of the mother as "the real Other of demand, whose de­
sire (that is, her desire) one wishes she would as­
suage ... " (Ecnrs 321). 
'Love in the imaginary is fundamentally a narcissis­
tic illusion and is closely related to the ego ideal (Lacan, 
Seminar I, 112, 126, 142, 180), but love depends on more 
than just the imaginary: "No love can be functionally 
realisable in the human community, save by means of 
a specific pact, which, whatever the form it takes, always 
tends to become isolated off into a specific function, at 
one and the same time within language and outside of 
it. That is what we call the function of the sacred, which 
is beyond the imaginary relation" (174; see also 217, 
276-77). 
5As Eco says, "en odio trueco el amor" (403). One 
finds love at the juncture of the symbolic and the imagi­
nary, while hate lies at the intersection of the imaginary 
and the real (Lacan, Seminar I, 271; see also 276-77). 
When the symbolic fails to hold, imaginary rivalries and 
defenses take over. 
6See Lacan, Ecnrs307. Merrim (113) describes Eco's 
role as that usually assigned to the devil in the auto sac­
ramental, and suffering from the same loss of resem­
blance that Lucifer did upon his fall. 
'For a general discussion of the symbolic, see 
Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacon, 130-37, 145-83. 
"The importance of speech to the subject, and the 
essential relationship of speech and the symbolic, is 
discussed directly in 'The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis" in Ecnrs. See in par­
ticular pages 56-77; see also 125, 285-86, 305. 
9See Lee 64--{)7; Ragland-Sullivan, jacques Lacon, 55, 
305. Regnault deals with the paternal metaphor in a spe­
cifically religious context on 61-62,91,95, 100. 
10See also 323-28. For Lacan's discussion of sight, 
the gaze, and the lure, see Four Fundamental Concepts 
93, 102-03. 
"There is something of masquerade here, a refer­
ence to feminine sexuality that is more capable of the 
mystic experience of unity with the Other and the ac­
companying;ouis:l'ance than is the masculine. This mas­
querade will serve as a lure to capture God in the 
imaginary realm of love. See Lacan, Ecn'ts 289-91; 
Safouan 110. 
12Lacan, Four Fundamenta/218, 221. See also Lacan, 
"Of Structure" 194, and Feminine 35, 94, 104, 120; Lee 
146-54; MacCannell 13. 
13Lacan, "Desire" 25; Ecnrs 195, 311; Feminine 168. 
See also MacCannell 55, 68, 81. 
14Merrim (114) has noted the similarity with a tech­
nique of Athanasius Kircher by which one forms new 
words by removing one or two letters from the previ­
ous word (clamore, amore, more, ore, re). Octavio Paz 
has dealt at some length with the influence of Kircher 
on Sor Juana. He notes that the idea to cast Christ as 
Narcissus shows an "extraordinary similarity" to the 
first section of the Colj!us Henneticum, and he suggests 
that Sor Juana might have been inspired by Kircher's 
version ( 462-64). Imanol San Jose Azueta agrees, add­
ing that the particular version of the Narcissus myth that 
Sor Juana must have followed came not from Ovid but 
from Pausanias (115-19).0 
15Cf. Lacan, Ecnrs320: "Only my formulation of phan­
tasy enables us to reveal that the subject here makes 
himself the instrument of the Other's;ouis:l'ance." 
16Although Gracia is a character in this auto, her role 
is not doctrinally important. While grace is called "Ia 
mejor prenda del alma" (1 007 -8), Gracia mainly serves 
here to inform Naturaleza Humana about what she is 
doing and should do, and at one point the two charac­
ters are placed on stage in such a way as to appear to be 
looking at each other, yet another instance of specular 
identification. See also 1131ff., 961-68, 2023-24. 
170n both the hypostatic union and the nature of the 
Trinity, especially in relation to Calderon's El diablo 
mudo, see Dietz 'Theology" 98, 102-4. Concerning the 
allegorical representation of God as three different char­
acters in Calderon's auto, La vida es suefio, see Dietz, 
"Conflict" 180-81. 
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